Democracy and economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa: a panel data approach by Jaunky, Vishal
Empir Econ (2013) 45:987–1008
DOI 10.1007/s00181-012-0633-x
Democracy and economic growth in Sub-Saharan
Africa: a panel data approach
Vishal Chandr Jaunky
Received: 16 July 2011 / Accepted: 16 July 2012 / Published online: 12 September 2012
© Springer-Verlag 2012
Abstract This paper studies the link between democracy and economic develop-
ment for 28 countries of Sub-Saharan Africa for the period 1980–2005 in a panel
data framework. A democracy index constructed from the Freedom House indices.
A variety of panel data unit root and cointegration tests are applied. The variables
are found to be integrated of order one and cointegrated. The Blundell–Bond system
generalized methods-of-moments is employed to conduct a panel error-correction
mechanism based causality test within a vector autoregressive structure. Economic
growth is found to cause democracy in the short-run, while bidirectionality is uncov-
ered in the long-run. In addition, the long-run coefficients are estimated through the
panel fully modified ordinary least squares and dynamic ordinary least squares meth-
ods. Democracy has a positive impact on GDP and vice versa. These results lend
support to the virtuous cycle hypothesis.
Keywords Democracy · GDP · SSA · Panel data
JEL Classification C33 · O40
1 Introduction
Despite its huge resource endowments, the Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), which adds up
to 48 of the 54 African countries, remains to date, the poorest region in the world.
In 2007, its gross domestic product (GDP) per capita was estimated to be only about
$1,869 (World Bank 2009). The SSA has been severely marked by a long series of
civil wars and political turmoil (Jézéquel 2006). Democracy has been lacking and this
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Table 1 GDP and democracy trend, 1980–2005
Countries Real GDP (million $) Democracy index
1980 1990 2000 2005 1980–2005 1980 1990 2000 2005 1980–2005
Benin 1084.3 1411.8 2254.8 2727.2 1738.7 1.5 3.0 6.0 6.0 3.9
Burkina Faso 1100.6 1555.6 2610.9 3529.5 1972.3 2.5 2.5 4.0 4.0 3.0
Burundi 559.4 865.1 709.1 789.7 749.4 1.5 1.5 2.0 4.0 1.8
Cameroon 6338.8 8792.7 7990.3 12056.5 9277.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Cen. Af. Rep. 735.3 814.6 959.4 914.8 836.4 2.0 2.5 4.5 3.5 2.9
Chad 664.9 1105.7 1385.1 2776.4 1279.3 1.5 1.5 2.5 2.5 2.0
Congo, DR. 7015.8 7659.5 4305.8 5238.6 6185.9 1.5 2.0 3.0 3.0 2.6
Congo, Rep. 1746.4 2795.6 3219.9 3975.5 2919.9 2.0 2.0 1.5 2.0 1.7
Cote d’Ivoire 7727.4 8297.6 10417.0 10409.0 8961.3 2.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 2.6
Gabon 3594.3 4298.5 5067.8 5523.0 4578.8 2.0 4.0 3.5 3.0 3.0
Gambia, The 213.5 304.5 420.9 508.5 333.7 5.5 6.0 2.0 3.5 4.0
Ghana 2639.9 3266.9 4977.5 6364.1 3852.1 5.5 2.5 5.5 6.5 3.7
Kenya 7086.8 10557.3 12705.3 15160.4 10721.5 3.5 2.0 2.5 5.0 2.7
Liberia 1390.9 433.0 560.9 444.2 699.3 2.0 1.0 2.5 4.0 2.5
Madagascar 3098.7 3265.6 3877.6 4339.1 3308.9 2.0 4.0 5.0 5.0 4.0
Malawi 999.8 1243.0 1743.5 1827.1 1359.9 1.5 1.5 5.0 4.0 3.1
Mali 1536.0 1630.1 2422.5 3294.1 1973.2 1.5 2.5 5.5 6.0 3.8
Mauritius 1518.4 2679.0 4469.3 5474.6 3204.0 5.0 6.0 6.5 7.0 6.3
Niger 1523.4 1507.0 1798.4 2207.0 1636.9 1.5 2.5 4.0 5.0 2.8
Nigeria 31451.8 34977.8 45983.6 60557.0 38045.5 5.5 3.0 4.0 4.0 3.2
Rwanda 1457.0 1781.6 1810.9 2351.1 1701.1 2.0 2.0 1.5 2.5 1.9
Senegal 2682.7 3463.3 4691.8 5891.1 3871.6 4.0 4.5 4.5 5.5 4.4
Sierra Leone 935.3 1021.6 633.8 1201.6 913.6 3.0 2.5 3.5 4.5 3.0
South Africa 95502.5 110944.7 132877.6 160792.9 117675.6 2.5 3.5 6.5 6.5 4.5
Swaziland 554.0 1023.8 1388.7 1561.6 1052.5 3.0 2.5 2.5 2.0 2.5
Togo 964.2 1070.7 1329.1 1479.5 1121.9 1.5 2.0 3.0 2.5 2.3
Zambia 2729.8 3027.5 3237.7 4088.7 3101.0 2.5 2.5 3.5 4.0 3.5
Zimbabwe 4376.4 6733.7 7399.2 5618.1 6382.0 4.5 3.0 2.5 1.5 2.9
Source Computed. Note In connection with the Democracy index, countries whose ratings average between
1.0 and 2.9 are Not Free, those between 3.0 and 5.4 are Partly Free, and those between 5.5 and 7.0 are Free
has also arguably led to low income levels in the region. As stated by Diamond (2005),
“… Africa cannot develop without democracy and that democracy in Africa ultimately
cannot be sustained without development.” Furthermore, he defines democracy “… as
a system of government in which the people choose their leaders and representatives,
and can replace them, in regular, free and fair elections.” As exposed in Table 1, while
several states of the SSA are still undemocratic (Not Free), for some, there has been a
slow but firm march towards democracy. From an economic perspective, the question
of whether democracy affects economic growth is critical to policymakers who seek
to promote greater political freedom to fuel economic development in the SSA.
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This paper explores the linkage between democracy and economic growth for
a sample of 28 countries of the SSA1 over the period 1980–2005. Two genera-
tions of panel unit root and cointegration tests are conducted. These are followed
by a panel vector error-correction mechanism (VECM)-based causality test, uti-
lizing the system generalized methods-of-moments (GMM) technique. The long-
run estimates are computed by means of the panel fully modified ordinary least
squares (FMOLS) and dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS) estimators. Democ-
racy scores are obtained from the Freedom House website. Real GDP (constant
2000) data are obtained from the World Bank CD-ROM 2008. Similar to Narayan
et al. (2011), real GDP is used to capture economic growth. The democracy index
is simply built by averaging of the sum of civil liberties and political rights indi-
ces.2 The political rights index shows how fair and meaningful elections are carried
out, while the civil liberties index involves freedom of press, freedom of speech,
freedom of religious belief, and the right to protest and organize. These scores are
re-adjusted whereby a score of 1 means least free, whereas a score of 7 reflects most
free.
Freedom House data are quite popular and have been used extensively in the liter-
ature. Such application has to do with a variety of studies examining the implications
of economic freedom on economic growth (Hanke and Walters 1997), political insti-
tutions on the environment (Bhattarai and Hammig 2001), financial development on
corruption (Altunbas¸ and Thornton 2012), among others. In addition to the Free-
dom House, other freedom indicators are compiled by the Fraser Institute, Heritage
Foundation, International Institute for Management Development (IMD), and World
Economic Forum. These are assessed and compared by Hanke and Walters (1997),
who pinpoint to several limitations accruing during the construction of the indicators
by those institutions. However, as argued by Hanson (2003), “… Freedom House’s
renown as an arbiter of political freedom and civil liberties gives its index instant cred-
ibility, which may explain the failure of Hanke and Walters to challenge it (p. 642).”
The Freedom House index does have its criticisms. According to Minier (1998),
the subjectivity involved when building the index brings in some measure of error
and bias. Democracy is a multifaceted theme and the index is argued to be based on a
checklist which includes limits on suffrage, freedom of the press, and restrictions on
individuals running for office. In addition, the overall ranking done by the Freedom
House can be debated to be entirely impressionistic. The index also tends to force a
seemingly continuous variable into a discrete ranking system. Nevertheless, as argued
by Tavares and Wacziarg (2001), the index is fashioned with the intension of consis-
tency across time and across countries and this makes it suitable to use in a panel data
setting. The rest of the paper is set out as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the
theoretical and empirical literature involving the democracy–economic growth nexus.
Section 3 presents the testing frameworks. Section 4 discusses the results. Section 5
concludes.
1 The selection of countries is done purely on the availability of data.
2 The characteristic of each score is available online at http://www.democracyweb.org/about/fiw1.php.
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2 Review of theoretical and empirical literature
Since the seminal work of Lipset (1959), a voluminous number of scholarly works
analyzing the link between economic development and democracy has emerged. As
stated by him, “perhaps the most widespread generalization linking political system
to other aspects of society has been that democracy is related to the state of economic
development,” where educated people are apt to “…believe in democratic values and
support democratic practices (p. 75).” On the word of Pennar et al. (1993), “… rising
incomes at first go toward needed goods and investment, then later toward more and
more of what economists call ”luxury goods,” such as higher education. A more edu-
cated population tends to demand political and civil rights, and so democratization
begins.” Economic growth is therefore conducive to democracy (Huber et al. 1993;
Barro 2002). The Lipset hypothesis will be supported if in the long-run, a change in
economic growth causes a change in democracy and a rise in economic growth results
in greater democracy.
The impact of democracy on economic growth is less straightforward and has
been a matter of much more controversy among scholars. Mixed findings have been
observed.3 To illustrate this connection, Sirowy and Inkeles (1990) put forward three
major perspectives. These are namely the “conflict,” “compatibility,” and “skeptical”
ones. First, the conflict perspective views democracy as a big hurdle to economic
growth. To experience economic expansion, policies inhibiting excessive increase
in real wages and promotion of both national and foreign capital accumulation are
required. Unless these policies are adopted, rapid growth of industrialization has a
tendency to to be delayed. This in turn slows down the process of economic growth.
Democratic governments are looked upon to be vote maximizers and they are more
concerned about implementing myopic policies such as state benefits and welfare
policies at the expense of accumulation. Democracy has thus a negative impact on
economic growth (Tavares and Wacziarg 2001; Heo et al. 2008). In essence, the con-
flict hypothesis will be supported if in the long-run, a change in democracy causes
economic growth and a rise in democracy has a negative effect on economic growth.
On the contrary, the compatibility perspective is incompatible with an authoritarian
model where economic development is exclusively directed by a centralized body or
dictator. As a consequence, democracy is considered to sustain equitable allocation
of resources and power, reduce distributional conflicts, and support fundamental civil
liberties and political rights. These are appropriate to create the necessary socio-polit-
ico-economic conditions favorable to economic growth. The impact of democracy
on economic growth is expected to be positive (Kurzman et al. 2002; Ghosh and
Gregoriou 2009). Fundamentally, the compatibility hypothesis will be supported if
in the long-run, a change in democracy causes economic growth and an increase in
democracy has a positive effect on economic growth.
3 Kurzman et al. (2002) review 47 quantitative studies of the effect of democracy on economic growth.
19 found a positive relationship between democracy and growth, 6 found a negative relationship, and 10
reported no statistically significant relationship. 7 studies found a combination of positive and non-sig-
nificant results, depending on the model used and the cases included; 2 found a combination of negative
and non-significant results; 2 found mixed positive and negative results; and 1 (Barro 1996) reported an
inverted-U effect.
123
Democracy and economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa 991
Finally, from the skeptical perspective, there is no systematic relationship between
democracy and economic growth (Rodrik 1997). With regard to this perspective, fac-
tors such as the effectiveness of government policies, institutional maturity, and the
coordination of government entities, etc. play a more significant role in economic
performance than the presence or absence of democracy (Heo 2010). For instance,
Przeworski and Limongi (1993) find no conclusive effect of democracy on economic
growth. As stated by them “… the impact of political regimes on growth is wide open
for reflection and research (p. 66).” The skeptical perspective will be supported if no
causal link between democracy and economic growth exists. In addition, a symbi-
otic link between democracy and economic growth can correspondingly exist (Bhalla
1997), with both having a positive effect on each other. This can be referred to the
virtuous cycle hypothesis. The Lipset and compatibility hypotheses are assumed hold
at the same time.
The existing empirical literature4 has largely revolved around correlation and
regression techniques while the causal effect between democracy and economic growth
has actually been overlooked. As discussed above, reverse causality is an obvious pos-
sibility and this can lead to biased estimates. So far, only a few studies have tried to
examine any causal link between those two variables and these are mainly based on
time series analysis. Heo and Tan (2001) study such link for 32 developing coun-
tries over the period 1950–1982. Their results support a causal relationship running
from economic growth to democracy for Costa Rica, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Israel,
Mexico, Nicaragua, South Korea, Thailand, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Next, unidi-
rectional causality running from democracy to growth is found for Bolivia, Burma,
Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Indonesia, Iran, Paraguay, Philippines, and South
Africa. Bidirectional causality is stumbled upon for Chile, Dominican Republic, and
Turkey. They find no relationship between economic growth and democracy for Argen-
tina, Brazil, Haiti, Honduras, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, and Sri Lanka.
Using ECM techniques, a few studies have applied more sophisticated causality
tests to examine any short-run or long-run effects. Narayan and Smyth (2006) find
a bidirectional causal relationship between democracy and economic growth in the
short-run. A unidirectional causal relationship running from democracy to economic
growth is likewise discovered in the long-run for China over the period 1972–1999.
Narayan et al. (2011) examine similar link for 30 countries of SSA over the period
1972–2001. They use two democracy indices, viz. the Freedom House political rights
index and the Legislative index of Electoral Competitiveness (LIEC). They find sup-
port for the Lipset hypothesis for Botswana and Niger with both datasets, for Chad
with the Freedom House data and for Cote d’Ivoire and Gabon with the LIEC data.
Support for the compatibility hypothesis is found for Botswana with the Freedom
House data and for Madagascar, Rwanda, South Africa, and Swaziland with the LIEC
data. Support for the conflict hypothesis is found for Gabon with the Freedom House
4 A relevant study includes Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994) where they examine the causal link between
economic development and economic growth for 131 countries over the period 1972–1989. They locate
unidirectional causality running from economic development to democracy. Campos and Nugent (2002)
test whether a causal and negative long term relation exist between political instability and economic growth
98 countries and find no evidence of such relationship.
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data and Sierra Leone with the LIEC data. For most of the countries in their sample,
the skeptical hypothesis is supported.
One major problem with econometrics research is the lack of sufficient observations
over long periods in the context of the need to test for unit roots and cointegration
amongst the series. Failure to do so exposes the study to the criticism of spurious
results. Time series tests can be subject to criticism of low power especially when
the number of observations is relatively small. As claimed by Toda (1995) “… 100
observations are not sufficient to ensure good performance of the tests (p. 79).” One
potential solution to this problem is to employ panel data techniques. These allow for
a significant increase in testing power relative to conventional time series methods
(Coakley and Fuertes 1997). This paper attempts to add new empirical evidence to
the literature by revisiting the democracy–economic nexus for the SSA within a panel
data framework.
3 Testing framework
To test for any causal effects between democracy and economic growth, a panel
Granger-type causality test is constructed. Granger causality does not however mean
true causality. Such statistical concept is based on linear regression stochastic pro-
cesses (Granger 1969). It can only be interpreted as showing whether prior changes
in one series add (or do not add) significantly to the explanation of the future value
of another series (Farr et al. 1998). The Granger causality test requires variables to be
stationary, as it can yield spurious results (Granger and Newbold 1974). This problem
can be avoided by taking advantage of a VECM-based causality test. Some prelimi-
nary testing such as unit root and cointegration tests are required before carrying out
the Engle–Granger residual-type causality approach. First, both variables have to be
non-stationary and integrated of same order, such as order one, denoted as I(1), to
test for cointegration (Engle and Granger 1987). Macroeconomic variables tend to be
non-stationary in nature. A series Yt is integrated order of d, i.e., Yt ∼ I(d), if it were
to be differenced by d times to become stationary. Cointegration between democracy
and real GDP should be established before proceeding to the VECM-based causality
test.
To verify the order of integration, a battery of panel unit root tests will be performed.
Inferences on a single test can lead to inappropriate conclusion about the order of inte-
gration as none of the current panel unit root tests are devoid of statistical limitations
in terms of size and power properties. The first generation tests are conceptualized
by Hadri (2000), Levin et al. (2002, LLC), Im et al. (2003, IPS), and Im et al. (2005,
ILT). These tests do not explicitly control for cross-sectional dependence. Each panel
is assumed to operate independently from each other. This condition is rather unrealis-
tic. Recent second generation relaxes the assumption of cross-sectional independence
and account for any correlation among the panels. These tests are derived by Pesaran
(2007); Chang and Song (2009) and Hadri and Kurozumi (2012).
Unit root tests are usually worked out using two distinct specifications. One test
includes a constant term only and the other contains both a constant term and a time
trend. These tests can be sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of a trend. There should
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be a careful use of a deterministic trend or “otherwise results can be misleading (p.
51)” (Ahking 2002). Macroeconomic data tend to exhibit a trend over time. Intuitively,
it is more apt to consider a regression with a constant and a trend at level form. Since
first-differencing tends to remove any deterministic trends in the variables, inferences
will be done in line with a specification with a constant term only. For the sake of
completeness, both specifications are computed.
After checking the order of integration of the two variables, panel cointegration
tests can be afterward conducted. First, Nyblom and Harvey (2000) propose a non-
parametric cointegration test of common trends. The test assumes where H0 is the
stationarity of the series around a deterministic trend and there exists k < n common
trends (where rank ( η) = k), against the alternative of a random-walk component
incidence, where there exists more than k common trends (where rank ( η) > k).
This test tests for the H0 of 0 common trends against the hypothesis of common
trends among the variables. The non-parametric cointegration test is followed by two
parametric ones. Second, Pedroni (1999) proposes several tests with the H0 of no
cointegration. These computed statistics are called within-dimension- and between-
dimension-based statistics. Similar to panel unit root tests, panel cointegration tests
can suffer from the problems of cross-sectional dependence. Westerlund (2007) advo-
cates a cointegration test which can handle this issue. This can be considered as a
second-generation panel cointegration test. This test is based on structural instead of
residual dynamics and there is no one common factor restriction. Baltagi (2008) pro-
vides a thorough review of the panel unit root and cointegration literature which indeed
points towards the vital importance of controlling for cross-sectional dependence.
If the variables are cointegrated, causality should occur in at least one direction
(Baffes and Shah 1994). Consistent with Jaunky (2011), the ρth order VECM struc-
ture can be represented as follows:
[
LGDPi t
LDEMi t
]
=
[
α1
α2
]
+
ρ∑
k=1
[
β11k β12k
β21k β22k
] [
LGDPi t−k
LDEMi t−k
]
+
[
φ1
φ2
] [
ECMi t−1
] +
[
ε1i t
ε2i t
]
(1)
where i = 1, . . . , N ; t = ρ + 1, ρ + 2, . . . , T ; the αs, βks, and φs are parameters
to be estimated. ECMi t−1 represents the one period lagged error-term derived from
the cointegrating vector and the error terms ε1i t and ε2i t are assumed to be serially
independent with mean zero and finite covariance matrix. Given the use of a vector
autoregressive (VAR) model, all variables are treated as being endogenous. LDEMi t
and LGDPi t denote the natural logarithmic of real GDP and democracy for country
i ay time t . A simple Wald test for the joint significance can be applied to examine
the direction of any causal relationship. For instance, democracy does not Granger-
cause economic growth if and only if all the coefficients β12k; ∀ = 1, 2, . . . , ρ are not
significantly different from zero in Eq. (1). The dependent variable reacts merely to
short-term shocks. In the similar fashion, economic growth does not Granger-cause
democracy in the short-run if and if all the coefficients β21k; ∀ = 1, 2, . . ., ρ are not
significant from zero. These can be referred to as the “short-run Granger causality”
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test. The coefficients on the ECMs represent how fast deviations from the long-run
equilibrium are eliminated. An additional channel of causality can be studied by test-
ing the significance of the ECMs. This test is referred to as the “long-run Granger
causality” test.
The estimators in Eq. (1) are biased due to the correlation among the lagged depen-
dent variables and the error terms. To account for the correlation and endogeneity
problems, Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest a two-step difference GMM approach,
where the lags of explanatory variables in levels are to be used as instruments. In the
first step, the error terms are assumed to be independent and homoscedastic. In the
second step, the first-step residuals are applied to construct consistent variances and
covariances matrices, with the former assumptions are relaxed. For the instruments to
be valid, ε1 and ε2 should not be serially uncorrelated. This condition occurs when
there is statistical evidence of a significant and negative first-order serial correlation
(AR(1)) and no evidence of second-order serial correlation (AR(2)) in the differenced
residuals mutually. The optimal lag length ρ is chosen if such condition is satisfied.
The Arellano–Bond estimator suffers from a lack of power of the internal instru-
ments. Following Blundell and Bond (1998), if the lag of the dependent variable and
the explanatory variables are persistent in time, lags of the levels of these variables will
be weak instruments for the equation in differences. They consequently recommend
the system GMM. This estimator is a linear combination of the levels and differences,
where the weight specified to the levels estimators grows in the prevalence of weak
instruments owing to the high persistency in the series. In the presence of heteroske-
dasticity and serial correlation, the two-step system GMM employs of a consistent
estimate of the weighting matrix, using the residuals from the one-step estimator
(Davidson and MacKinnon 2004). In contrast to the conventional OLS method, the
system GMM does not assume normality and controls for heteroskedasticity.
The two-step system GMM estimator is more efficient than the one-step one. Nev-
ertheless, it converges slowly to its asymptotic distribution and its standard errors tend
to be biased downwards for finite samples. The one-step estimator does not experi-
ence such problem. The finite-sample correction to the two-step covariance matrix as
derived by Windmeijer (2005) can be employed. The superiority of the two-step robust
system GMM can be maintained. This approach uses multiple lags as instruments. The
system is as a consequence over-identified. To test if the model is correctly specified
and instruments are valid, both the Hansen (1982) J and the Sargan (1958) tests are
computed. The latter is not robust to heteroscedasticity or autocorrelation, whereas,
the former, which is the minimized value of the two-step GMM criterion function, is.
The system GMM makes an exogeneity assumption where any correlation between
endogenous variables and unobserved or fixed effects are constant over time. This
allows the inclusion of levels equations in the system and use of lagged differences
as instruments for these levels. The exogeneity assumption can be tested by using a
difference-in-Hansen test (Bond et al. 2001).
Besides, the long-run impacts are required to test the aforementioned hypotheses.
Bidirectional causality between LDEMi t and LGDPi t is found in the long-run. This
situation is synonymous to endogenous regressors which can produce inconsistent
and biased estimates. Long-run and efficient estimates can be obtained through the
FMOLS and DOLS. These respective non-parametric and parametric methods can
123
Democracy and economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa 995
Table 2 LLC panel unit root test statistics
Variables Deterministics Level form First-difference
t value t* t value t*
LGDPi t Constant −5.811 −1.50693 [0.066]‡ −12.581 −1.47332 [0.070]‡
Constant + trend −10.204 1.43561 [0.924] −14.055 −0.23175 [0.408]
LDEMi t Constant −6.662 −0.15055 [0.440] −16.121 −2.57481 [0.005]*
Constant + trend −10.637 0.60743 [0.728] −17.537 0.11423 [0.5455]
Source computed. Note These LLC statistics are distributed as standard normal as both Nand T grow large.
Assuming no cross-country correlation and T is the same for all countries, the normalized t* test statistic
is computed by using the t value statistics. After transformation by factors provided by LLC, the t* tests
is distributed standard normal under the H0 of non-stationarity. It is compared to the 1, 5, and 10 % sig-
nificance levels with the one-sided critical values of −2.326,−1.645, and −1.282 correspondingly. The
p values are in square brackets. *, **, and ‡ denote 1, 5, and 10 % significance level, respectively. These
notations are applied for all succeeding tests
effectively correct for the biases resulting from the endogeneity of regressors over
and above serially correlation and heteroskedasticity in error terms (Pedroni 2001).
According to Kao and Chiang (2000), the DOLS method tends to outperform the
FMOLS estimators in term of mean biases.
Equation (1), in conjunction with the long-run estimators, can be used to test the
hypotheses linking democracy and economic growth. The Lipset hypothesis holds if,
in the long-run, real GDP Granger-causes democracy and an increase in real GDP has
a positive effect on democracy. Subsequently, the compatibility hypothesis holds if,
in the long-run, democracy Granger-causes real per capita GDP and an increase in
democracy results in an improvement in real per capita GDP. In contrast, the conflict
hypothesis holds if, in the long-run, democracy Granger-causes real per capita GDP
while a rise in democracy has a negative effect on real GDP. The skeptical hypothesis
holds if there is no causal relationship between democracy and real GDP. Finally, the
virtuous cycle hypothesis holds if bidirectionality prevails and each variable having a
positive effect on each other.
4 Results
For implementation of the panel unit root tests, the Bartlett kernel is used. All band-
widths and lag lengths will be equal to 4(T/100)2/9 ≈ 2.97, where T = 26 (Basher
and Westerlund 2008). The maximum lag length lies between 2 and 3. Too few lags
may adversely affect the size of a unit root test, while too many lags can reduce the
power of the unit root test (Campbell and Perron 1991). Martins (2011) applies 2
lags when performing the Pesaran panel unit root test over a period of 1980–2005.
Since the time span is relatively short, the lowest value possible of 2 is chosen to
conduct the panel unit root tests. The LLC test statistics are reported in Table 2. Both
LGDPi t and LDEMi t are computed to be non-stationary and I(1), in keeping with the
above-mentioned intuition about the order of integration.
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The LLC panel unit root test assumes homogeneity in the AR(1) coefficients of
the augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) specifications. Such assumption is quite implau-
sible. Auxiliary tests, allowing for heterogeneity or cross-sectional dependence are
needed to fully evaluate the order of integration of a series. The test assumes inde-
pendently and identically distributed (iid) errors within their model. This assumption
is violated in the presence of cross-sectional dependence. Residuals are hence con-
temporaneously correlated. In effect, cross-sectional dependence can lead to biased
panel data unit root tests towards the alternative hypothesis (Banerjee et al. 2004).
LLC (2002) recommends demeaning the series across N to attenuate this problem.
Demeaned data refer to the extraction of the means from the time series. The rationale
of demeaning is to remove the correlation in the sample. Such dependence can arise as
a result of spatial spill-over effects, common unobserved shocks, social interactions,
etc. (Breitung and Pesaran 2008).
The degree of cross-sectional dependence can be evaluated by calculating the pair-
wise correlations5 between changes in a variable (Koedijk et al. 2004). The pair-wise
correlation coefficients of the first-differences in two series tend to be generally positive
and quite large. For example, the correlation coefficient of LGDPi t between Ivory
Coast and Zimbabwe is equal to 0.4717 and for Central African Republic (Cen. Af.
Rep.) and Liberia, it is 0.4878. The pair-wise correlation coefficients of LGDPi t
range from −0.6460 to 0.5869. Next, the pair-wise correlation coefficient of LDEM
between Congo Republic and Senegal is 0.3579 as well as for Burundi and Nigeria,
it is 0.4221. Overall, the pair-wise correlation coefficients of LDEMi t range from
−0.7138 to 0.7508. These results show evidence6 of a high degree of cross-sectional
dependence within the SSA panel.
The IPS test allows for heterogeneity though it tends to have low power in panels
with small T (Karlsson and Lothgren 2000). To some extent, it deals with cross-sec-
tional dependence via demeaning. As revealed in Table 3, both LGDPi t ∼I(1) and
LDEMi t ∼I(1). These tests are done using both the raw and demeaned data. Above
and beyond, the ignorance of structural breaks can lead to a fall in power and to the
rejection a unit root even although the trend stationarity alternative is true (Perron
1989). The ILT LM panel unit root test can account for such breaks and is regarded
as being more powerful than the IPS test. Results in Table 4 demonstrate the rejection
of the H0 of a unit root after controlling for the presence one or two structural shifts
in the trend.
It is not always simple to conclude about the order of integration of a series. Rejec-
tion of the H0 of a unit root can be due to the existence of as few as one stationary
series in the panel (Choi 2004). Kwiatkowski et al. (KPSS, 1992) recommend a test
of the null of stationarity hypothesis to complement the null of a unit root one. This
5 Detailed results of the pair-wise correlations are available upon request.
6 For example, further evidence of cross-sectional dependence is obtained by estimating the following
fixed-effects panel data model: LGDPi t = βLDEMi t + uit , where uit is the error term. When running the
model, β = 0.253, with a p value of 0.000. The Pesaran (2004) test statistic of cross-sectional independence
is equal to 37.369, with a p value of 0.000. The absolute value of the off-diagonal elements is next computed
to be 0.548. These results reveal a high degree of cross-sectional dependence (De Hoyos and Sarafidis 2006).
Moreover, groupwise heteroskedasticity is also found. Greene (1993) test statistics is equal to 2140.98 with
a p value of 0.000. The null of homoskedasticity is rejected.
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Table 3 IPS panel unit root test statistics
Variables Data Deterministics Level form First-difference
t-bar Ψt t-bar Ψt
LGDPi t Raw Constant −0.167 7.354 [1.000] −2.837 −7.755 [0.000]*
Constant + trend −1.922 1.054 [0.854] −3.034 −5.692 [0.000]*
Demeaned Constant −1.523 −0.356 [0.361] −2.408 −5.370 [0.000]*
Constant + trend −2.065 0.182 [0.572] −2.562 −2.895 [0.002]*
LDEMi t Raw Constant −1.336 0.707 [0.760] −2.814 −7.627 [0.000]*
Constant + trend −1.867 1.385 [0.917] −2.951 −5.202 [0.000]*
Demeaned Constant −1.408 0.296 [0.616] −2.840 −7.773 [0.000]*
Constant + trend −1.865 1.400 [0.919] −3.049 −5.781 [0.000]*
Source Computed. Note t-bar is the panel test based on ADF statistics. Critical values for the t-bar statistics
without trend at 1, 5, and 10 % significance levels are −1.820,−1.730, and −1.690 while with inclusion of
a time trend, the critical values are −2.450,−2.370, and −2.320, respectively. Assuming no cross-country
correlation and T is the same for all countries; the normalized Ψt test statistic is computed by using the t-bar
statistics. The Ψt tests for H0 of joint non-stationarity and is compared to the 1, 5, and 10 % significance
levels with critical values of −2.330,−1.645, and −1.282 correspondingly. The p values are in square
brackets
Table 4 ILT panel LM unit root test statistics
Variables Level form
With one break With two breaks
LGDPi t −6.752* −8.251*
LDEMi t −7.644* −10.267*
Source Computed. Notes Critical values for the LM panel unit root test are distributed asymptotic standard
normal and are −2.326,−1.645, and −1.282 at the 1, 5, and 10 % levels, respectively. The minimum LM
unit root test which accounts for a break in the trend is employed to test for the H0 of non-stationarity
Table 5 Hadri panel unit root test statistics
Variables Data Deterministics Level form First-difference
Z Z
LGDPi t Raw Constant 20.3348* 1.1330
Constant + trend 12.5066* 5.2247*
Demeaned Constant 17.9371* 1.0420
Constant + trend 12.5911* 5.2570*
LDEMi t Raw Constant 16.2974* −0.7847
Constant + trend 8.5300* 2.3251**
Demeaned Constant 13.7646* −0.7547
Constant + trend 9.2276* 2.2868**
Source Computed. Note Hadri’s test is based on the average of the N country-specific KPSS LM-statistics
under which the H0 of stationarity is tested. Heteroskedasticity is controlled while computing the statistics.
Each Z statistic is compared to the 1, 5, and 10 % significance levels with the one-sided critical values of
2.326, 1.645, and 1.282, respectively
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Table 6 Pesaran CADF panel unit root test statistics
Variables Deterministics Level form First-difference
t-bar Z t-bar Z
LGDPi t Constant −1.332 2.255 [0.988] −2.480 −3.943 [0.000]*
Constant + trend −2.454 −0.817 [0.207] −2.686 −2.142 [0.016]**
LDEMi t Constant −1.439 1.678 [0.953] −2.635 −4.779 [0.000]*
Constant + trend −1.469 4.783 [1.000] −3.003 −3.943 [0.000]*
Source Computed. Note The Pesaran CADF test of the H0 of non-stationarity is based on the mean of
individual DF (or ADF) t-statistics of each unit in the panel. Critical values for the t-bar statistics without
and with trend at 1, 5, and 10 % significance levels are −2.300, −2.150, and −2.070; and −2.810, −2.660,
and −2.580, respectively. Assuming cross-section dependence and T is the same for all countries. The
normalized Z test statistic is computed by using the t-bar statistics. The Z test statistic is compared to
the 1, 5, and 10 % significance levels with the one-sided critical values of −2.326,−1.645, and −1.282
correspondingly
can lead to a substantial gain in power of the testing framework. Such joint testing is
commonly known as “confirmatory analysis” (Romero-Ávila 2008). The Hadri panel
unit test offers a fitting alternative. These are based on the mean of KPSS test statistic.
Table 5 shows the Hadri test statistics. The variables are found to be I(1).
One major drawback of the first generation of panel unit root tests lies in their
assumption about cross-sectional independence. These tests tend to suffer from size
distortions in the presence of cross-sectional dependence, leading to a low power of the
testing framework (Herwartz and Siedenburg 2008). For instance, such dependence
may have caused the failure to reject the alternative hypothesis of stationarity at level
form for the ILT test. Most of the first generation tests resort to demeaned data to
tackle this problem. This approach assumes the existence of one common factor with
the same effect on all the units, which is quite restrictive. The demeaning of data may
not “… eliminate the size problem caused by the variation of cross correlations, and
lead to false inference (p. 309)” (Strauss and Yigit 2003).
The second-generation panel unit root tests explicitly control for cross-sectional
dependence rather than using demeaned data. Pesaran (2007) suggests a test which
allows for the presence of more general cross-sectional dependence patterns. To con-
trol for these patterns, the standard ADF regression models are augmented with the
cross-section averages of lagged levels and first-differences of the individual series.
The Pesaran test is based on the averages of the individual cross-sectionally augmented
ADF (CADF) statistics. The test is found to have good size and power properties, even
when N and T are relatively small. As presented in Table 6, results from the Pesaran
test corroborate with the earlier tests. Both variables are once more found to follow
an I(1) process.
A further challenge when carrying out a panel unit root test is to control for
cross-sectional cointegration. Long-run dependence occurs when two or more units
or countries share a common stochastic trend. This situation can again bias upwards
the probability of Type I error of panel unit root tests whereby the H0 is wrongly
rejected (Banerjee et al. 2005). As such, cross-sectional cointegration can invalid not
only first generation tests but also second-generation tests, such as the Pesaran test.
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Table 7 Chang and Song panel unit root test statistics
Statistics LGDPi t LDEMi t
Level form First-difference Level form First-difference
tac 2.08851 −7.39912* −1.69250** −12.36729*
tah 0.80839 −1.41420‡ −1.04353 −4.75161*
taa 0.75548 −0.41184 −0.94468 −2.62035*
tmc −1.52119 −2.91941‡ −2.21668 −5.33674*
tmh −1.08889 −1.84161 −1.54508 −5.48529*
tma −0.61145 −2.07986 −1.12159 −3.33591**
Source Computed. Note The nonlinear IV average and minimum tests are denoted by the ta and tm while the
subscripts c, h, and a refer to those tests with single IGF and no covariate, with single IGF and covariate and
orthogonal IGF with no covariate, respectively. The tests include a constant term only. The H0 of non-sta-
tionarity is tested. Each test statistic is compared to the 1, 5, and 10 % significance levels with the one-sided
critical values of −2.326,−1.645, and −1.282 for the average test while these are −3.402,−2.928, and
−2.696 for minimum test, respectively. The critical values for latter (N = 30) are computed by Chang and
Song (2009)
Based on the Chang (2002) nonlinear IV panel unit root test, Chang and Song (2009)
recommend a test which makes use of a set of orthogonal functions as instrument
generating function (IGF) to tackle any forms of dependence. As exposed in Table 7,
two different types of panel unit root tests are proposed. The average tests relate to
the testing of the H0 of non-stationarity for all individual units, whereas the minimum
tests evaluate the H0 of non-stationarity of some individual units in the panel. Three
test statistics, such as tac, tah , and tmc, confirm an I(1) process for LGDPi t , while all
statistics, apart from the tac statistic, provide similar evidence for LDEMi t .
As a final and confirmatory test, the Hadri and Kurozumi test of the H0 of stationa-
rity is applied. This test is essentially an extension of the Hadri test and it allows the
Lagrange multiplier (LM) test to control for cross-sectional dependence. Though it is
similar to the KPSS test, the regression is augmented by cross-sectional average of the
observations, in same way as the Pesaran test which augments the conventional ADF
regression. As revealed in Table 8, two test statistics are computed. The Z As pc and
Z Ala are the augmented panel KPSS test statistics with long-run variance corrected
by the Sul et al. (2005) and lag-augmented (Choi 1993; Toda and Yamamoto 1995)
methods, respectively. LGDPi t is found to be I(1) when referring to Z Ala . In contrast,
LDEMi t is computed to be I(0) as indicated by both statistics. Failure to reject the
H0 for LDEMi t contradicts our expectation of non-stationarity. As indicated by Caner
and Kilian (2001), unit root tests for the null of stationary, such as the KPSS test, tend
to have serious size distortions when the H0 is close to the alternative of a unit root.
This situation may well be applied to panel unit root tests. In general, though there is
overwhelming evidence supporting, an I(1) process both LGDPi t and LDEMi t .
Various panel cointegration tests are next implemented. Table 9 reports the Nyb-
lom and Harvey test statistics under both iid random-walk (RW) errors (NH-t) and the
serially correlated residuals (NH adj-t) assumptions. No model needs to be estimated
as the test is based on the rank of covariance matrix of the residuals driving the mul-
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Table 8 Hadri and Kurozumi panel unit root test statistics
Statistics Deterministics LGDPi t LDEMi t
Level form First-difference Level form
Z Aspc Constant −1.28075 1.44300‡ 0.09730
Constant + trend 3.17061∗ 5.07164∗ −1.07182
Z Ala Constant −1.77349 0.53785 0.13316
Constant + trend 1.99839∗∗ 4.27586∗ −0.96926
Source Computed. Note The H0 of stationarity is tested. The Z Aspc and Z Ala test statistics is compared
to the 1, 5, and 10 % significance levels with the one-sided critical values of 2.326, 1.645, and 1.282,
respectively
Table 9 Nyblom–Harvey panel cointegration test statistics
Specifications Statistics LGDPi t LDEMi t
Fixed effects NH-t 12.9808* 12.4615*
NH adj-t 134.4808* 133.3846*
Fixed effects and time trends NH-t 11.1346* 11.5385*
NH adj-t 88.4109* 114.8347*
Source Computed. Note The H0 of the test is no cointegration (H0 : rank(var–cov) = K = 0) against the
alternative hypothesis of cointegration (H1 : rank(var–cov) = K = 0). H0: 0 common trends among the
28 series in the panel. NH-t : the test is performed under the hypothesis of iid errors. NH adj-t : errors are
allowed to be serially correlated and the test is performed using an estimate of the long-run variance derived
from the spectral density matrix at frequency zero. Critical values for the t-bar statistics without and with
trend at 1, 5, and 10 % significance levels are 7.1862, 6.4117, and 6.0307; and 2.5905, 2.3997, and 2.3010,
for N equals 30, respectively
Table 10 Pedroni panel cointegration test statistics
Statistics Without trend With trend
Panel ν −1.74846 5.82008*
Panel ρ 0.77669 0.40157
Panel pp 0.23779 −1.44577‡
Panel adf 1.35077 −1.56545‡
Group ρ 2.80923 2.03288
Group pp 1.99732 −0.71100
Group adf 2.99250 −1.84306**
Source Computed. Note The H0 of no cointegration is verified. These statistics are compared to a one-
sided standard normal test with critical values of 1, 5, and 10 % given by −2.326,−1.645, and −1.282,
respectively. A special case is the panel ν-statistic which diverges to positive infinity under the alternative
hypothesis. The asymptotic distributions are derived in Pedroni (1999, 2004)
tivariate RW. Two specifications such as fixed effects without and with time trends
are computed. The H0 of no cointegration is rejected for both the iid RW NH-t and
the non-parametric adjustment (with 2 lags) long-run variance, denoted by NH adj-t
specification.
The results for the Pedroni test statistics are displayed in Table 10. Seven test sta-
tistics with the H0 of no cointegration are computed. Four of these statistics, called
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Table 11 Westerlund panel cointegration test statistics
Statistics Without trend With trend
Value Z p value Robust p value Value Z p value Robust p value
Gt 0.203 5.999 1.000 1.000 −2.136 1.500 0.933 0.610
Ga 0.050 4.481 1.000 1.000 −8.415 2.799 0.997 0.344
Pt 1.021 3.189 0.999 0.878 −14.477 −3.772 0.000* 0.096‡
Pa 0.011 1.896 0.971 0.828 −6.800 1.840 0.967 0.344
Source Computed. Note The H0 is no cointegration is tested. Notes Gt, Ga, Pt, and Pa are Westerlund (2007)
cointegration test statistics in panel error-correction. All these statistics are distributed standard normally.
Critical values of one-sided tests for 1, 5, and 10 % significance levels are −2.326,−1.645, and −1.282,
respectively
panel cointegration statistics, are within-dimension-based statistics. These statistics
are the panel ν, panel ρ, and panel pp, denoting the non-parametric variance ratio,
Phillips–Perron ρ, and Student’s t-statistics, respectively, whereas the panel adf is a
parametric statistic based on ADF statistic. The other three statistics, called group
mean panel cointegration statistics, are between-dimension-based statistics. These are
the group ρ, group pp, and group adf, representing the Phillips–Perron ρ-statistic, Phil-
lips–Perron t-statistic, and the ADF statistic, respectively. The three statistics allow
for the modeling of an extra source of prospective heterogeneity across units. The H0
cannot be rejected when the tests are executed when without a trend. On the contrary,
when a time trend is included in the tests, H0 is systematically rejected in four cases
as confirmed by the panel ν, panel pp, panel adf, and group adf statistics. These two
cointegration tests rely on the assumption of cross-sectional independence in the error
term. This condition is unlikely to hold in practice.
The Westerlund test does control for cross-sectional dependence. Four test statistics
are computed. Ga and Gt test statistics test the H0 of no cointegration for at least one
of the cross-sectional units. Pa and Pt test statistics use the pooled information over
all the cross-sectional units to test the H0 of no cointegration for the whole panel. The
H0 of no cointegration which infers whether the error-correction term in a conditional
error-correction model is equal to zero is tested. If the H0 of no error-correction is
accepted, then the H0 of no cointegration is also accepted. These tests have limiting
normal distributions and are consistent. Results are reported in Table 11. To control for
cross-sectional dependence, robust critical values is obtained through 500 bootstrap
replications. The number of lags and leads are set to one. Similar to the Pedroni test,
the H0 cannot be rejected when a trend is excluded from the tests. But, the H0 of no
cointegration is rejected for the Pt test statistic when a trend is included in the test.
The cointegration tests appear to be sensitive to the insertion of a time trend. Given
the characteristics of the series, it is practical to integrate a deterministic time trend.7
7 Hassler (2002) studies the implications of excluding a trend in time series cointegration tests. According
to him, the asymptotic critical values of cointegration tests are affected by the presence of the linear trend in
the regressors. Failure to account this fact can too often lead to tests which are biased towards establishing
cointegration. Hence, this raises the need to consider a linear trend when testing for a long-run relationship.
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Table 12 Blundell–Bond system GMM panel VAR causality test
Variables LGDPi t LDEMi t
LGDPi t−1 0.3364532 −0.7952365
(0.1314181)** (0.4563114)‡
LDEMi t−1 0.0336239 0.1810297
(0.0667132) (0.1343565)
ECTi t−1 −0.0059861 −0.1132842
(0.0034986)‡ (0.0385936)*
Constant 0.0143265 0.0492928
(0.0045967)* (0.0120067)*
Observations 560 560
Number of instruments 28 28
Wald χ2(3) 8.14 20.68
[0.043]** [0.000]*
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions 15.89 9.11
[0.892] [0.997]
Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions 25.32 23.22
[0.388] [0.507]
Difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity 6.19 2.38
[0.626] [0.984]
AR(1) test of serial correlation −2.01 −2.66
[0.045]** [0.008]*
AR(2) test of serial correlation 1.30 1.17
[0.193] [0.243]
Short-run causality test 0.25 3.04
[0.614] [0.081]‡
Long-run causality test 2.93 8.62
[0.087]‡ [0.003]*
Source Computed. The model is estimated by the two-step system GMM. The robust standard errors are in
parenthesis while p values are in square brackets. The explanatory variables are assumed to be endogenous
and are instrumented in GMM-style à la Roodman (2006)
Table 12 presents the causality results of the Blundell–Bond system GMM panel
VECM estimation. Due to rather small number of SSA countries in the sample, the
use of too many instruments can cause the Sargan and Hansen tests to be weak. For
small finite samples, a large number of weak instruments can overfull the endogenous
variables and also reduce the accuracy in parameter estimations of the Sargan and
Hansen tests of the instrument of joint validity (Roodman 2009). There is no formal
test to detect “too many” instruments. One way to avoid such problem, is to use the rule
of thumb of maintaining the number of instrument less than or equal to the number of
groups (e.g., Docquier et al. 2011). As such, the number of instruments used is equal
to 28.
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Table 13 Panel FMOLS and DOLS estimates
Dependent
variables
Independent variable
LGDPi t LDEMi t
FMOLS DOLS FMOLS DOLS
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
LGDPi t – – – – 0.30 3.65* 0.38 5.25*
LDEMi t 0.08 3.85* 0.08 5.00* – – – –
Source Computed. Note For the panel DOLS, maximum lag and lead length are set to 1 since T < 30
(Nelson and Donggyu 2003). For the FMOLS, the selection of bandwidth for kernels is automatically com-
puted. The critical values of the two-tailed t-statistics test at 1, 5, and 10 % significance levels are 2.326,
1.645, and 1.282 for the panel, respectively
A telltale sign of valid instruments is a high p value of the Hansen J statistic
of at least 0.25 (Roodman 2009). The Sargan and Hansen statistics are both greater
than 0.25, confirming the validity of the instruments in use. Negative first-order serial
correlation in the disturbances is discovered in the first differenced residuals. No sec-
ond-order serial correlation is established. These results imply an absence of serial
correlation among disturbances. Subsequent to the conjecture discussed previously,
the lag order ρ of the panel VECM-based causality tests is computed to be 1. Real
GDP is found to Granger-cause democracy in the short-run whereas a feedback rela-
tionship between real GDP and democracy prevails in the long-run. As observed
in Table 12, the occurrence of endogenous regressors validates the use of efficient
long-run estimators such as the FMOLS and DOLS. Autocorrelation is as well found
when using the Wooldridge (2002) test. The autocorrelation statistic is computed as
F(1, 27) = 74.302 with a p value of 0.000. To control cross-sectional dependence,
common time dummies are included in the respective long-run estimators (Pedroni
2001). Referring to Table 13, both long-run estimators yield roughly similar results.
The impact of democracy on economic growth and vice versa is found to be positive
and is significant at 1 % level.
The above results reflect the importance of democracy in stimulating economic
growth and vice versa. Narayan et al. (2011) find no systematic relationship between
democracy and real GDP for the vast majority of countries (26 out of 30) when
using the Freedom House index. His findings give support to the skeptical hypothesis
for the SSA. Alternatively, by taking advantage of the increased power of the panel
framework, such hypothesis is clearly rejected. In the short-run, democracy does not
Granger-cause economic growth. This can be regarded as consistent with the skeptical
hypothesis. But, in the long-run democracy and economic growth are found endoge-
nously related. Democracy is found to Granger-cause economic growth and its impact
on the latter is found to be positive. This is consistent with the compatibility hypoth-
esis which displays the importance of democracy in promoting economic growth.
Economic growth is also found to Granger-cause democracy in both the short-run and
long-run and has a long-run positive impact. This is consistent with the Lipset hypoth-
esis which highlights the significant role of economic growth to sustain democracy.
All together, the virtuous cycle hypothesis is supported.
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5 Conclusion and policy implications
The paper has examined the relationship between democracy and economic growth
for a sample of 28 countries of SSA over the period 1980–2005. To conduct the study,
a democracy index has been constructed from the Freedom House data. To make effi-
cient inferences, various panel unit root and cointegration tests have been conducted.
Both variables are found to follow an I(1) process. Evidence of a long-run relationship
between democracy and economic growth is revealed. A panel VECM-based causality
test is subsequently performed with the help of the Blundell–Bond two-step system
GMM and the long-run impacts have been estimated using the panel FMOLS and
DOLS estimators. Democracy is found to have no impact on economic growth in the
short-run which is consistent with the skeptical hypothesis. Even so, economic growth
does cause higher democracy in the short-run. In the long-run, democracy and eco-
nomic growth are found to be mutually reinforcing with both having a positive impact
on each other. This supports the virtuous cycle hypothesis.
These results have profound policy implications for the SSA. To some extent, the
lack of democracy has gone a long way to explain the region’s poor economic perfor-
mance. Breaking this vicious cycle and turning it into a virtuous one is in the realm of
the policymakers. Reforms in connection with the political system can be proposed
without much concern about their impacts on economic growth in the short-run. Still,
in the long-run, the strengthening of democracy is apt to improve economic growth
whilst further economic growth can lead to the enhancement of democracy.
As implied by the results, free and fair elections and a reliable democratic sys-
tem are important ingredients to ensure not only peace and political stability but are
also part and parcel of a sound and smooth running economy (Sobhee 2009). Then
again, democracy alone may not be sufficient. Adequate investment in human capital
should equally take place. For instance, the deepening of education can improve the
distribution of intellectual power resources and therefore reinforce the social basis
of democratic political competition (Vanhanen 2004). Besides, democracy is intrinsi-
cally linked with financial development. Financial liberalization has long been con-
sidered as an engine of growth by the developed countries and has been prescribed to
developing economies to enhance their catching-up process (Baltagi and Demetriades
2011). But, greater private liberty and freedom can lead to excessive financial dereg-
ulation and liberalization which in turn can cause financial crises (Lipscy 2011). An
efficient financial system should also be regarded as the backbone of a healthy democ-
racy. In sum, a democratic government can more efficiently deal with market failures
such as limiting environmental degradation and catering for public and merit goods
such as roads, defense, education, and health care assistance in a satisfactory manner.
A well-functioning financial market can also be ensured by enacting proper laws and
regulations.
So far, various efforts have been made by the SSA to support democracy and eco-
nomic development. In September 2000, the SSA members, alongside other devel-
oping nations, have signed the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) at United
Nations Headquarters in New York, in a view to eradicate poverty and generate greater
economic prosperity by 2015. The promotion and consolidation of democracy is a cru-
cial item on the agenda. Along the same lines, the establishment of the African Union
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(AU) in July 2002 was done with the main intention of promoting economic devel-
opment across the African regions with special emphasis being laid on democratic
institutions, good governance and human rights. The establishment of the 2001 New
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) programme under the aegis of the
African Union illustrates the will of the African states to eliminate conflicts and push
towards a democratic system of governance. Its objectives, which are close to those
of the MDGs, are aimed at fostering Africa’s growth, development, and participation
in the global economy. However, to be able to operate in an effective way, the credi-
bility of the AU and NEPAD should be maintained by holding each member state to
adhere to high standards of democracy and imposing consequences for those states
not abiding to them. To sum up, democracy is the key to unlocking the door of greater
economic prosperity in the SSA.
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